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Abstract—The notion of stochastic stability is used in game
theoretic learning to characterize which joint actions of players
exhibit high probabilities of occurrence in the long run. This
paper examines the impact of two types of errors on stochastic
stability: i) small unstructured uncertainty in the game param-
eters and ii) slow time variations of the game parameters. In
the ﬁrst case, we derive a continuity result bounds the effects of
small uncertainties. In the second case, we show that game play
tracks drifting stochastically stable states under sufﬁciently slow
time variations. The analysis is in terms of Markov chains and
hence is applicable to a variety of game theoretic learning rules.
Nonetheless, the approach is illustrated on the widely studied
rule of log-linear learning. Finally, the results are applied in
both simulation and laboratory experiments to distributed area
coverage with mobile robots.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen tremendous interest in dis-
tributed/cooperative control decision architectures, in which
interconnected components seek to achieve a collective ob-
jective in a dynamic or uncertain environment [1], [2]. One
approach to distributed control is to view the problem from the
perspective of game theory. Since game theory concerns the
study of interacting decision makers, the relevance of game
theory to distributed control is easily recognized. Still, this
perspective is a departure from the traditional study of game
theory, where the focus has been the development of models
and methods for applications in economic and social sciences
(cf., the discussion in [3], [4]).
Of speciﬁc interest in the game theory literature is game
theoretic learning [5]–[7]. This topic concerns the analysis of
distributed adaptation rules and their convergence to solution
concepts such as Nash equilibrium. The motivation is that the
establishment of simple algorithms that converge, for example,
to Nash equilibrium strengthen the case for Nash equilibrium
as a solution concept. The relevance to engineered systems is
that distributed components can be incentivized through the
appropriate design of a game whose equilibria represent a de-
sirable operating condition. Game theoretic learning provides
a starting point for the construction of iterative algorithms
to reach equilibrium. A representative citation is [8] which
presents connections between game theoretic learning and
various cooperative control problems. Other settings include
vehicle-target assignment [9], wind energy harvesting [10],
content distribution [11], and ad hoc networks [12].
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One relevant notion of convergence in this literature is
stochastic stability. A distributed adaptation rule may have
multiple convergent outcomes. In assessing stochastic stability,
one analyzes a randomized perturbation of this rule. The
effect of the randomization is to induce mixing among all
possible steady state outcomes. However, as the perturbation
size is diminished, it may be that one outcome is favored
among others in that in the long run it occurs with increasing
probability whereas other outcomes occur with vanishingly
small probability as the size of the randomized perturbation
diminishes. In other words, a stochastically stable outcome
occupies almost all of the mass of an associated underlying
stationary distribution.
Two standard references are [13], [14], which discuss equi-
librium selection between risk dominant or payoff dominant
equilibrium in symmetric 2×2 games. Their analysis examines
a particular stochastic adaptation rule and establishes that
risk dominant Nash equlibria are stochastically stable over
payoff dominant equilibria. Other utilizations of stochastic
stability include a simple model of language evolution [15],
and emergent structures in self-assembly [16].
This paper investigates the robustness of stochastic sta-
bility, i.e., how stochastic stability conclusions are affected
by deviations from a nominal setup. The ﬁrst setup involves
perturbed dynamics. One motivation in the game theoretic
learning framework stems from a presumed ability to measure
utility functions. These computations may require estimates
from persistently noisy measurements or may neglect latent
state variables. We establish a continuity result that shows
how small perturbations to the learning rule induce small
effects on the limiting stochastic behaviors. The second setup
concerns slowly varying dynamics. A standard assumption in
game theoretic learning is a stationary environment, e.g., the
game is ﬁxed. We investigate the case of slow variations and
show that for sufﬁciently slow time variations, the limiting
behavior “tracks” the stochastically stable states.
Other papers also have examined robustness in game theo-
retic learning rules. This work includes modiﬁcations of log-
linear learning [17], perturbations of so-called potential games
[18], [19], and variations on player selection and tie-breaking
rules [20], [21].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents background material regarding stochastic stability
and the basic game setup. Section III presents the main
results regarding robustness of stochastic stability. Section IV
specializes these results to learning in games, and in particular,
to log-linear learning. Section V presents both simulations
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games. Finally, Section VI presents concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND MATERIAL
This section presents selected terminology and background
material.
A. Preliminaries
For x ∈ Rn, |x| denotes the usual Euclidean norm, and
 M  denotes the associated induced matrix norm. The vector
1 denotes a column vector
￿
1 1 ... 1
￿T
of appropriate
context dependent dimension. |Z| denotes the number of
elements of the ﬁnite set, Z = {1,2,...,n}. ∆(n) denotes
the n-dimensional probability simplex, i.e.,
∆(n) =
￿
x ∈ Rn ￿
￿ 1Tx = 1,xi ≥ 0
￿
.
Let Sn denote the set of n×n stochastic matrices, i.e., matrices
with nonnegative entries whose rows sum to one. Any P ∈ Sn
deﬁnes a Markov chain over some state space Z with |Z| = n,
where where the ijth element of P, Pij, denotes the transition
probability from state i ∈ Z to state j ∈ Z. In case P has
a single aperiodic recurrent class [22], there exists a unique
stationary distribution µ ∈ ∆(n) such that
µTP = µ
and for all x ∈ ∆(n),
lim
t→∞xTPt = µT.
B. Stochastic Stability
The following is adapted from the presentations in [14] and
[23].
Deﬁnition 1. Let P0 ∈ Sn deﬁne a Markov chain on
Z = {1,2,...,n}. Let
￿
Pǫ ￿ ￿ ǫ ∈ (0,¯ ǫ]
￿
⊂ Sn deﬁne a
family Markov chains on Z. The family {Pǫ} is a regular
perturbation of P0 if i) each Pǫ has a single aperiodic
recurrent class; ii) for each i,j ∈ Z,
lim
ǫ→0
Pǫ
ij = P0
ij;
and iii) there exists a µ∗ ∈ ∆(n) such that
lim
ǫ→0
µǫ = µ∗,
where µǫ is the unique stationary distribution of Pǫ.
Deﬁnition 2. Let {Pǫ} be a regular perturbation of P0. A
state i ∈ Z is stochastically stable if
lim
ǫ→0
µǫ
i = µ∗
i > 0.
The interpretation is that stochastically stable states have
non-vanishing occupancy frequencies over the long run for
small ǫ, whereas the remaining states have vanishingly small
occupancy frequencies. References [14] and [23] present meth-
ods to determine stochastically stable states while bypassing
an explicit construction of stationary distributions and their
limits.
C. Potential Games
There is a set of players, or agents, denoted N =
{1,2,...,n}. The notation −i denotes the complementary set,
{1,2,...,i − 1,i + 1,...,n}. For each i ∈ N, Ai denotes the
ﬁnite set of actions available to agent i. The set of joint actions
is A = A1 ×...×AN with elements a = (a1,a2,...,an). The
utility function of agent i is a mapping Ui : A → R. An action
proﬁle a∗ ∈ A is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if
Ui(a∗
i,a∗
−i) = max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai,a∗
−i).
We will refer to a game, G, as the collection of a player set,
action set, and utility functions.
A game, G, is a potential game [24] if it satisﬁes the fol-
lowing property. There exists a potential function φ : A → R,
such that for all a = (ai,a−i) ∈ A and a′ = (a′
i,a−i) ∈ A,
φ(ai,a−i) − φ(a′
i,a−i) = Ui(ai,a−i) − Ui(a′
i,a−i).
III. ROBUSTNESS OF STOCHASTIC STABILITY
This section presents two results on the robustness of
stochastic stability. The ﬁrst result concerns perturbed Markov
chains, and the second slowly varying Markov chains. The
following section then specializes these results to analyze
robustness in game theoretic learning.
We will consider ﬁrst a perturbed stochastic system of
the following form. At each stage, t = 0,1,2,..., there is
a selection P(t) ∈ Sn. The state z(t) ∈ Z = {1,2,...,n}
evolves according to
Pr
￿
z(t + 1)
￿
￿ z(0),z(1),...,z(t)
￿
= Pr
￿
z(t + 1)
￿
￿ z(t)
￿
= Pz(t)z(t+1)(t). (1)
In other words, there is a set of possible transition probabilities
at each stage, and the transition probabilities at stage t observe
the Markov property with transition probabilities determined
by the speciﬁc selection P(t).
Theorem 1. Let P∗ ∈ Sn have a single aperiodic recurrent
class, and let µ∗ ∈ ∆(n) be the associated stationary
distribution over ﬁnite state space Z. For any δ1 > 0, there
exists a δ2 > 0 such that for the dynamic process deﬁned by
(1),
limsup
t=0,1,2,...
 P(t) − P∗  < δ2
⇒
limsup
t=0,1,2,...
|Pr[z(t) = i] − µ∗
i| < δ1, for all i ∈ Z.
Proof: Let the initial condition z(0) be selected according
to an arbitrary probability distribution x(0) ∈ ∆(n), and deﬁne
the switching linear system
x(t + 1) = PT(t)x(t).
By construction, for any i ∈ Z and t = 0,1,2,...,
Pr[z(t) = i] = xi(t).
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(i.e., WTW = I) that span the nullspace of 1T. Since x(t)
evolves over the simplex, one can uniquely write
x(t) = µ∗ + Ww(t)
for some w(t) ∈ Rn−1. Deﬁne E(t) = P(t) − P∗. Then the
above linear iterations can be written as
x(t + 1) = PT(t)x(t)
= PT
∗ µ∗ + ET(t)µ∗ + PT
∗ Ww(t) + ET(t)Ww(t).
Since µ∗ is a stationary distribution of P∗, PT
∗ µ∗ = µ∗.
Accordingly,
(x(t + 1) − µ∗) = PT
∗ Ww(t) + ET(t)µ∗ + ET(t)Ww(t)
⇒
w(t + 1) =
￿
WTPT
∗ W + WTET(t)W
￿
w(t) + WTET(t)µ∗.
Let A = WTPT
∗ W. Since P∗ has a single aperiodic recurrent
class, A is a stability matrix. In particular, there exists a
positive deﬁnite X = XT such that
ATXA − X < 0.
Standard Lyapunov arguments with wT(t)Xw(t) establish that
limsup
t=0,1,2,...
|w(t)|
can be made arbitrarily small, since diminishing δ2 implies
diminishing  E(t) .
Theorem 1 can be combined with the notion of stochastic
stability as follows.
Corollary 1. Let {Pǫ} be a regular perturbation of P0, and
let µ∗ be the associated distribution characterizing stochastic
stability. Let the dynamic process (1) satisfy
limsup
t=0,1,2...
 P(t) − Pǫ  < δ2.
For any δ1 > 0, there exist ǫ > 0 and δ2 > 0 such that
limsup
t=0,1,2,...
|Pr[z(t) = i] − µ∗
i| < δ1.
Proof: Let µǫ be the stationary distribution for Pǫ.
According to Theorem 1,
limsup
t=0,1,2,...
|Pr[z(t) = i] − µǫ
i|
can be made arbitrarily small with diminishing δ2. Likewise,
|µǫ − µ∗| can be made arbitrarily small with diminishing ǫ.
Combining these two bounds proves the desired result.
An implication of Corollary 1 is that if a state z is not
stochastically stable, then small perturbations limit the long
run probability of visiting this state.
We now consider the related setting stochastic stability for
a “drifting” process. Since the resulting dynamic process is
non-stationary, one can no longer discuss stochastic stability
in terms of a single stationary distributions. We will show that
for sufﬁciently slow drifting, the resulting dynamical system
“tracks” the drifting stochastically stable states.
Theorem 2. Let Θ ⊂ Rm be a compact set. For each θ ∈
Θ, let {Pǫ
θ} be a regular perturbation of P0
θ , and let µ∗
θ be
the associated distribution characterizing stochastic stability.
Furthermore, for each ǫ, let θ  → Pǫ
θ be continuous. Let the
dynamic process (1) satisfy
• P(t) ∈
￿
Pǫ
θ
￿ ￿ θ ∈ Θ
￿
, and
•  P(t + 1) − P(t)  < δ2.
For any δ1 > 0, there exist ǫ > 0 and δ2 > 0 such that
limsup
t=0,1,2,...
￿
￿
￿Pr[z(t) = i] − µ∗
θ(t)
￿
￿
￿ ≤ δ1.
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 1, let the initial condi-
tion z(0) be selected according to the probability distribution
x(0) ∈ ∆(n), deﬁne the switching linear system
x(t + 1) = PT(t)x(t),
and write
x(t) = µ∗
θ(t) + Ww(t).
Then
µ∗
θ(t+1) + Ww(t + 1) = (Pǫ
θ(t))T(µ∗
θ(t) + Ww(t)).
Rewriting the above equation leads to
w(t + 1) =WT(Pǫ
θ(t))TWw(t) + WT(µǫ
θ(t+1) − µ∗
θ(t+1))
+ WT(µǫ
θ(t) − µǫ
θ(t+1))
+ WT(Pǫ
θ(t))T(µ∗
θ(t) − µǫ
θ(t)),
where µǫ
θ(t) is the stationary distribution of Pǫ
θ(t). From
continuity of θ  → Pǫ
θ, the difference between stationary
distributions
￿ ￿
￿µǫ
θ(t) − µǫ
θ(t+1)
￿ ￿
￿ can be made arbitrarily strong
with diminishing δ2 using continuity of stationary distributions
with respect to transition probabilities (see [25]). Likewise, ￿
￿ ￿µǫ
θ(t) − µ∗
θ(t)
￿
￿ ￿ can be made arbitrarily small with diminishing
ǫ. Let A(θ(t)) = WT(Pǫ
θ(t))TW. The resulting analysis
resembles a slowly varying Linear Parameter Varying (LPV)
system (e.g., [26]–[28]) of the form
w(t + 1) = A(θ(t))w(t) + f(t)
where each A(θ(t)) is a stability matrix and |f(t)| is arbitrarily
small. Standard arguments regarding slowly varying systems
lead to the desired result.
IV. SPECIALIZATION: GAME THEORETIC LEARNING
This section presents an application of the robustness results
for the speciﬁc learning algorithm known as binary log-
linear learning [17]. Binary log-linear learning is a variant
of standard log-linear learning for potential games in which
players’ available action sets are constrained.
Standard log-linear learning, introduced in [29], assumes
that at each stage, every agent, i, can play any action in its
action set, Ai. In many applications, a set of available actions
that is available to a player can be restricted by the player’s
previous action. For example, suppose an action ai(t) corre-
sponds to a mobile agent’s position. Then mobility constraints
such as velocity limitations or physical obstacles imply that the
6162set of feasible possibilities for ai(t) is constrained by ai(t−1).
Reference [17] analyzes such a scenario.
First, for every i ∈ N, deﬁne the set valued maps
Ci : Ai → 2Ai.
These maps characterize constrained evolution. In particular,
at each stage t = 0,1,2,...,
ai(t) ∈ Ci(ai(t − 1)).
We make the following assumption on the constraint sets.
Assumption 1.
• Feasibility : For any player i ∈ I and any action
pair ai(0),ai(m) ∈ Ai, there exists a sequence of
actions ai(0) → ai(1) → ··· → ai(m) satisfyung
ai(k) ∈ Ci(ai(k − 1)) for all k ∈ 1,2,··· ,m.
• Reversibility : For any player i ∈ I and any action pair
a′
i,a′′
i ∈ Ai, a′
i ∈ Ci(a′′
i ) ⇔ a′′
i ∈ Ci(a′
i).
The following algorithm, called binary log-linear learning,
remedies this issue. At each time t, one player i ∈ N is
randomly selected and allowed to alter its action while all
other players repeat their actions, i.e., a−i(t) = a−i(t − 1).
The selected player i chooses a trial action ˆ ai uniformly from
the available action set Ci(ai(t−1)). Then player i randomizes
its action according to
p
ai(t−1)
i (t) =
e
1
τ Ui(a(t−1))
e
1
τ Ui(a(t−1)) + e
1
τ Ui(ˆ ai,a−i(t−1)) (2a)
p
ˆ ai
i (t) =
e
1
τ Ui(ˆ ai,a−i(t−1))
e
1
τ Ui(a(t−1)) + e
1
τ Ui(ˆ ai,a−i(t−1)) (2b)
p
ai
i (t) = 0, ∀ai  = ai(t − 1),ˆ ai. (2c)
In words, an agent uses a Boltzmann distribution to randomly
select between its previous action, ai(t − 1), and a randomly
selected feasible alternative from Ci(ai(t − 1)).
The following theorem characterizes the limiting behavior
associated with binary log-linear learning for the class of
potential games.
Proposition 1 (Marden & Shamma, 2012 [17]). Let G be
a ﬁnite n-player potential game. Binary log-linear learning
with perturbation parameter ǫ = e−1/τ deﬁnes a regular
perturbation of an associated limiting Markov chain. Let µ∗ be
the associated distribution characterizing stochastic stability.
Then
µ∗(a)  = 0 ⇔ a ∈ A∗.
From Proposition 1, binary log-linear learning (with
constraints) results in potential function maximizers being
stochastically stable.
We now illustrate the results of the previous section applied
to these learning rules. First, introduce a parameter dependence
on the utility functions as follows:
Ui : A × Θ → R,
where Θ ⊂ Rm is compact. Assume further that for every
a ∈ A, θ  → Ui(a;θ) is continuous. One can deﬁne parameter
dependent versions (omitted here for brevity) of binary log-
linear learning rules (2). The following two theorems apply
to either of these settings and are direct consequences of the
analysis in the preceding section.
Corollary 2. Suppose θo ∈ Θ results in a potential game. Let
µτ
θo be the stationary distribution of either log-linear learning
or binary log-linear learning. Then for every δ1 > 0, there
exists a δ2 > 0 such that
|θ(t) − θo| < δ2
for all t = 0,1,2,... implies that
limsup
t=0,1,2,...
|Pr[a(t) = a] − µτ
a| < δ1
for all a ∈ A.
Corollary 3. Suppose that any θ ∈ Θ results in a potential
game with potential function φ(a;θ). Then for either log-linear
learning or binary log-linear learning, for every δ1 > 0, there
exists a δ2 > 0 and τ > 0 such that
|θ(t + 1) − θ(t)| < δ2
for all t = 0,1,2,... implies that
liminf
t=0,1,2,...
Pr
￿
φ(a(t);θ(t)) = max
a∈A
φ(a;θ(t))
￿
> 1 − δ1.
The latter theorem implies that the joint action, a(t), plays
the potential function maximizer for the current value of the
drifting parameter, θ(t), with high probability, and in this sense
“tracks” the stochastically stable state.
So far, it was assumed that all players share the same
θ(t) in their utility functions. Now assume that each player
independently observes θ(t) with some bounded noise. Let
ˆ θi(t) be a observed θ(t) by player i at time t. Then the
modiﬁed strategy for binary log-linear learning takes the form
p
ai(t−1)
i (t) =
e
1
τ Ui(a(t−1);ˆ θ
i(t))
e
1
τ Ui(a(t−1);ˆ θi(t)) + e
1
τ Ui(ˆ ai,a−i(t−1);ˆ θi(t))
p
ˆ ai
i (t) =
e
1
τ Ui(ˆ ai,a−i(t−1);ˆ θ
i(t))
e
1
τ Ui(a(t−1);ˆ θi(t)) + e
1
τ Ui(ˆ ai,a−i(t−1);ˆ θi(t)).
Note that event density θ(t) is replaced with its noisy measure-
ment ˆ θi(t) from the original strategy. The following corollary
can be easily derived from Corollary 2 and Corollary 3.
Corollary 4. Suppose that any θ ∈ Θ results in a potential
game with potential function φ(a,θ). Then for either log-linear
learning or binary log-linear learning, for every δ1 > 0, there
exist δ2 > 0, δ3 > 0 and τ > 0 such that
|θ(t + 1) − θ(t)| < δ2
￿ ￿
￿ˆ θi(t) − θ(t)
￿ ￿
￿ < δ3
for all t = 0,1,2,... implies that
liminf
t=0,1,2,...
Pr
￿
φ(a(t);θ(t)) = max
a∈A
φ(a;θ(t))
￿
> 1 − δ1.
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This section presents dynamic event coverage as an illustra-
tive example of game theoretic learning. A signiﬁcant amount
of research (e.g., [30]–[34]) has been devoted to the use of
mobile robots for surveillance. In this section, we will assume
that there is dynamic events in a ﬁnite mission space. To apply
game theoretic learning, a dynamic event coverage problem is
formulated in a potential game.
Consider a group of n mobile robots, N = {1,2,··· ,n},
with limited sensor range trying to cover a ﬁnite two-
dimensional mission space. The mission space S is a set of
m discrete locations, i.e., S ≡ {s1,s2,··· ,sm}. Each robot
i ∈ N optimizes its position over S, so Ai = S.
There is a time-variant event density function θ(t) ∈
∆(|S|). The global objective, φ(a;θ(t)), at time t is a sum
of the covered event density, i.e.,
φ(t;θ(t)) =
X
sj∈S
Ia(sj)θj(t) (3)
where Ia : S → {0,1} is an indicator function deﬁned as
Ia(sj) = 1 if sj is in the range of at least one sensor under
the joint action a, and Ia(sj) = 0 otherwise.
Each player’s utility is deﬁned as its marginal contribution
to a global objective, i.e.,
Ui(ai,a−i;θ(t)) = φ(ai,a−i;θ(t)) − φ(a0
i,a−i;θ(t)) (4)
where a0
i denotes a null action which is equivalent to player
i turning off its sensor. In this setting, one can interpret
Ui(ai,a−i;θ) as a sum of the densities in sections exclusively
covered by player i. The utility design in (4) is called Wonder-
ful Life Utility (WLU) [35], and it is well known that WLU
constitutes a potential game [9] with potential function equal
to the global objective, φ.
Robots adhere to binary log-linear learning with ˆ θi, illus-
trated in the previous section. Each robot i independently
measures event density ˆ θi(t) with bounded random noise. A
size of measurement noise |θ(t) − ˆ θi(t)| is bounded by δ3
for all i ∈ N and t = 0,1,2,.... And it is assumed that
the available action set for a robot is its current section and
adjacent sections including diagonal directions.
For the remaining section, we will assume that the density
functions for events are Gaussian function and
P
sj∈S
θj(t) = 1
for all t.. Fig. 1 shows an example of sensor allocation and
event density. The center of each event density is drifting with
some bounded speed. Hence |θ(t+1)−θ(t)| is always bouned
by some δ2 for all t.
A. Simulation Results
In the following simulations, game theoretic learning was
tested with ﬁve mobile robots (N = 5). The mission space
was S = {1,2,··· ,30} × {1,2,··· ,30}, and coverage of
each mobile sensor had radius of 3 units length. The tem-
perature parameter τ for the strategy was 0.005. To illustrate
performance of the system, we ran simulations in both time-
invariant and time-variant environment settings.
5 10 15 20 25 30
5
10
15
20
25
30
Fig. 1. Example of sensor allocation and event density over the mission
space. Each circle indicates a coverage of a sensor.
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Fig. 2. Simulation results with static event density and dynamic event density
Fig. 2 (a) demonstrates simulation results with static event
density. Since θ(t) = θ(0) for all t, |θ(t+1)−θ(t)| was always
bounded by δ2 = 0. The three cases when a size of randomly
generated noise, |ˆ θi(t)−θ(t)|, was bounded by δ3 = 0.0, 0.2
or 0.4 were tested. As stated in Corollary 4, a joint strategy
converged to a neighborhood of the potential maximizer even
under the presence of noise, and smaller δ3 yields more stable
behavior.
Now consider the case when event density is time variant.
The simulation results with time variant event are given in
Fig. 2 (b). In the simulation, two centers of the events moved
with a speed less than 0.03 unit length per time step. In other
words, |θ(t+1)−θ(t)| was bounded for all t. Comparing with
the time invariant event cases from Fig. 2 (a), the results in
Fig. 2 (b) were less stable, but still the robots were able to
follow the moving events as predicted in the previous section.
B. Experimental Results
A heuristic variant of log-linear learning was tested in an
experimental setup with system with Khepera III [36] two-
wheeled mobile robots and OptiTrack motion capture system
[37]. A host computer generated an event density θ(t) over the
mission space and transmits to a robot its current position and
event density θj(t) for all section sj which is under coverage
of robot i. In this setup, each robot could observe its current
position and the event distribution within its coverage.
The number of robots was n = 4, and the mission
space was a discretized rectangular grid S = {1,2,...,19} ×
{1,2,...,19}.The length of the sections in the system was
0.2m, hence a size of the entire mission space was 3.8m ×
3.8m. While the Khepera III had a diameter of 0.13m, the
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Fig. 3. Experiment results with static event density and dynamic event density
coverage of each robot had a radius 0.4m.
In the implemented variant of log-linear learning, a robot
decided to stay at its current section for two seconds with
probability (1 − ω) = 0.3, or to select new action among
Ci(ai) based on its strategy with probability ω = 0.7. Robots
used the temparature parameter τ = 0.0046 for the strategy.
Experimental results for static and dynamic (i.e., drifting
time-variant) event distribution are shown in Fig. 3. The
average moving speed of the the robots was 0.075m/s, and
the moving speed of event center in dynamic event coverage
was 0.03m/s. These results indicate a tracking of the drifting
distribution that is comparable to the static distribution.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have examined the robustness of stochastic stability
in the presence of unstructured perturbations and in slowly
drifting environment. While the results were specialized to
variants of log-linear learning, the methods were derived for
Markov chains and hence can be valid for a variety of settings.
The approach was applied in both simulation and laboratory
experiments to distributed area coverage with mobile robots.
Future research directions include application to other dis-
tributed robotics problems, and, in the slowly varying setup,
to use a model of the environmental variations to help reduce
the time scale separation required in this approach.
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